THE ETHICS OF JOHN DEWEY
BY

JOHN

DEWEY,

in

J. V.

Human

NASH

Nature and Conduct, has presented

a

theory of ethics which exhibits a relation to the older school of
morals somewhat analogous to that which the modernist movement

Recent

in religion bears to the traditional theological orthodoxies.

tendencies in psychology are here applied to the problem of conduct,

and their implications thoroughly worked out. All supernatural
sanctions are discarded and morality grounded squarely on evolution, human nature, and the social environment.
The Deveian system is remorselessly scientific and pragmatic
yet

it

flowers in spiritual values, expressed in the idealism of self-

realization

and human fellowship.

own

The

individual self merges into

sovereignty and autonomy.

John
have performed the remarkable feat of bringing
William James, the pragmatist, and Josiah Royce, the idealist, together in a friendly handclasp, while H. G. Wells hovers in the
background, pronouncing benedictions out of God the hwisible King
and Alen Like Gods.
the social, without loss of

Dewey seems

And

its

to

yet, after all, the basis of the

new

— or salvation,

ethics

is

not

new

;

it is

that

—

you will through fellowship and service. He who of old said "I have come to let them have
life, and to let them have it in abundance" (John x.lO) also declared
"H anyone wishes to be first, he must be the last of all and the servant of all" (Mark ix.35). And Paul accompHshed the synthesis of
the individual with the social in the words "We are individually
parts of one another." (Rom. xii.5).^
Such was the message of another great religious teacher, denounced as a heretic by modern orthodoxy the late George Burman

of individual realization

if

:

:

—

who

conceived the mission of religion to be "the formation
of free and independent personalities, and a kingdom of such person1 Quotations from the recent Goodspeed translation of the New Testament.
Foster,
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which

alities, in

all

among them

ship

COURT

OPEN"

are ends, and no one mere means, the relation-

to be

-

one of mutual love and service."

Such, too. was the lesson which Maeterlinck learned from the
bees,

—the

articulation of the individual in the life of the group; a

lesson through which he
lighted the

pathway

overcame the terror of death, and which
new Romanticism of which he is the

to the

prophet.

This is pretty close to Royce's vision of the Great Community,
on which his dying eyes rested in the midst of a war-torn w'orld :^
"Its members wall not be merely individual human beings, nor

mere

yet

collections or

masses of human beings, however

vast, but

Ethical individualism has been, in
communities of some sort.
Ethical individthe past, one great foe of the Great Community.
ualism, whether it takes the form of democracy or of the irresponsible search on the part of individuals for private happiness or for
any other merely individual good, will never save mankind. Equally
useless, however, for the attainment of humanity's great end would
be any form of mere ethical collectivism that is, any view which
regarded the good of mankind as something which masses or crowds
.

.

.

;

or disorganized collections of

men

should win.

.

.

form which the highest
political unit,

such as

life

Dewey aproaches
ogy, and sociology

is

indeed the

of humanity must take, whether in a

or in the church universal, such

in a nation,

Without

as Paul foresaw.

Loyalty, the

.

devotion of the self to the interests of the community,

loyalty, there

the subject

is

from the

no salvation."

side of biology, psychol-

interpreting the accumulated results of research

;

in the fields of these sciences in

The somewhat

terms of humanism and

discursive treatment of his

theme

ethics.
is

explained

by the fact that the book grew out of a series of university lectures
delivered in California during the year 1918.
Moralists, says
tially evil

because

Dewey, have thought of human nature as essenresisted the yoke which they tried to place upon

it

"'Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors

it.

aims which were foreign to those upon

they were imposed
few have given and adminispassable fashion and with reluct-

to the young, laymen, ordinary folk

tered rule, and the mass have in a

have supplied the aims,

whom

;

a

ance obeyed."

The morality
to

of the theologians, according to

Dewey, would seem
"Gen-

be something akin to what Nietzsche called "slave morals."
2
''

See The Open Court, June, 1922, and January, 1923.
The Hope of the Great Community, posthumous essays by Josiah Rove, 1916.
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"good people have been those who did
and lack of eager compliance is a sign
Thus, "men have turned
of something wrong in their nature."
moral rules into an agency of class supremacy."
However, Dewey believes that there was in the beginning no
deliberate design to rule by imposing moral rules upon the masses.
He believes that ignorance of human nature and its rightful claims
is the primary cause of the false moral rules that have grown up.
The reason for this ignorance is that there was absolutely no scien"Lack of understanding of human
tific knowledge of any kind.
nature is the primary cause of disregard for it."
He goes on to say "A decline in the authority of social oligarchy
was accompanied by a rise of scientific interest in human nature."
Might it not be truer to the fact, however, to see in the rise of scientific interest, with the coming of the Renaissance and the spread of
the new learning through the invention of printing, that which was
really the chief factor in the decline of social oligarchy and the birth
of democracy, which in turn opened the way for scientific inquiry
into human nature ? In other words, the advance of physical science
broke down rigid class barriers and prejudices, so that there could
erally speaking," he says,

what they were

told to do,

:

be a free study of

Dewey

human

nature.

purpose of

states the

his

book as "a discussion of some

human

phases of the ethical change involved in positive respect for
nature

when

His point

the latter
is

is

associated with scientific knowledge."

well taken wherein he shows that the separating of

morals from physiology and psychology has resulted

in a

conven-

abnormal and pathological, because cut off
from living roots in human nature. "The badness of good people
... is the revenge taken by human nature for the injuries heaped
upon it in the name of morality." Thus we find people who are
"holy terrors." But such morality is usually negative, manifesting
itself in insipidity of character, sham "respectability." and downright hypocrisy.
It is a "drab morality," in which one dreads to
be himself. Its great aim is avoidance of what is considered bad
form, and in observing prohibitions, rather than in positive action
tional

goodness that

is

that has ethical value.

He shows how

the church, finding this system of morality un-

workable, has got around

it.

The

Catholic Church, with

natural morality, nevertheless allows
titude

and concessions

select

few,

who

many

to the frailties of the flesh.

retire to monasteries,

its

super-

dispensations to the mulIt

is

only the

that attempt to live

up

to
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Protestantism has accomplished the

the church's ideal morality.

same
winks

result
at

by

emphasis upon "justification by faith," which
lapses into the gregarious morals of average

its

"tlaily

Conduct."

Dewey

who

speaks of "those forceful natures

cannot tame them-

selves to the required level of colorless conformity."
is

Their attitude

usually unconscious, however, and "they are heartily in favor of

morality for the mass, as making

only standard

easier to

it

manage them.

Their

success, putting things over, getting things done.

is

Being good is to them practically synonymous with ineffectuality
and accomj)lishment, achievement, is its own justification. They
know by experience that much is forgiven to those who succeed and
they leave goodness to the stupid, to those whom they qualify as
boobs."

This certainly

who

acter,

is

much

akin to Nietzsche's idea of the superman,

good and

a law to himself, "beyond

is

however, according to Dewey,

men

hypocrisy, since

and are

institutions

is

evil."

This sort of char-

very apt to degenerate into

of this type usually pay tribute to established

fierce "in their denunciations of all

who

openly

defy conventionalized ideals."

Another
against

evil result of this false

usually

it

morality

complete licentiousness, and think that the
viduality

is

freedom

that those

who

rebel

way

to realize their indi-

by the most abandoned gratification of their physical

"They

passions.

is

the other extreme and identify freedom with

fly to

in the

treat subjection to passion as a manifestation of

degree in which

who do

Again, those few

it

arated from the actual facts of
'"spiritual egotists."

He

shocks the bourgeois."

take seriously the idea of morals sep-

human

nature are apt to become

says that "their exaltation of conceit

them absolutely inhuman

his Varietifif of Reliaious Experience, cites

makes

"William James, in

in their selfishness."

some examples of

this

type which bear out Dewey's statement.
In other cases, says Dewey, this ideal moral world becomes a

refuge from the real world, into which

men

retire

from time

to time,

sometimes offsetting the strain by "pleasurable excursions into the

many

cases of

lived in alternating periods of piety

and de-

delights of the actual."

irdivid"als

who have

History, to be sure, records

bauchery.

One

'^^f

the worst

nature, thinks
in

efifects

Dewey,

is

of the separation of morals from

that

human

nature

is

left

the o-dinary relationships of business, civic

human

without any guide

life,

friendship,

and
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"In short, the severance of morals from human nature
recreation.
ends by driving morals inwards, from the public, open, out-of-doors
air and light of day, into the obscurities and privacies of an inner
life."

This driving inward of morality results

in

"the almost complete

severance of ethics from politics and economics."

regarded as

summed up

in edifying exhortations,

The former is
and the latter as

connected with arts of expediency separated from larger issues of
good."

This explains why there are today two schools of social reform,
one based upon "the notion of a morality which springs from an
inner freedom, something mysteriously cooped up within personality,"
holding that the
their hearts.
tains that

ment, that

On

way

to

change institutions

the other hand,

we have

is

for

men

to purify

the school which main-

"men are made what they are by the forces of the environhuman nature is purely malleable, and that till institutions

are changed nothing can be done."

It is

the old problem of free will

versus determinism.

Neither of these views,

He

Dewey

believes, expresses the real truth.

an alternative.

"All conduct is interaction
between elements of human nature and the environment, natural
and social. He believes that progress proceeds in two ways, and
that "freedom" is found "in that kind of interaction which mainholds that there

tains

is

in which human desire and choice count for
There are forces within man as well as outside, and

an environment

something."

the problem of ethics

is

one of adjustment, intelligently attained.

Morals are not degraded by dealing with material things. Much
of the suffering and unnecessary slavery of the world, he thinks, is
due to the inherited belief that moral questions can be settled privately in our minds, apart from any practical application of knowledge

in industry, law,

This shows that

and

politics.

Dewey would

apply to ethics the pragmatic

method which William James applied
the test of the value of moral ideas

According

to

dualism of which

Dewey,

this

is

to philosophy.

In other words,

their result in practical action.

view of ethics

we have been speaking

will

do away with the

in morality.

"It

would put

an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds."
Again, it makes ethics a social, not an individual science, because "it
would find the nature and activities of one person coterminous with
those of other

human

and therefore
and economics."

beings,

ot history, sociology, law,

link ethics with the study
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He

does not claim that such a view of ethics would automatically
make the moral life as simple as speeding

solve moral problems or

down

a lighted boulevard.

It

would simply enable us to approach

moral problems with a constantly growing fund of knowledge based
on past experience.
In short, morals must be integrated with human nature, and both
with the environment. Then we shall have a science of ethics recognizing the continuity of nature, man. and society, and which will be
(1) serious but not fanatical, (2) aspiring but not sentimental, (3)
adapted to reality but not conventional. (4) sensible but not profitseeking, (5) idealistic but not romantic.

Such a point of view brings morals down
aspire to heaven,

still

it

is

to the

to earth,

and

"if

they

heavens of the earth, and not to

another world."

He

then goes into an extended discussion of various factors

entering into

human

nature and conduct: (1)

The

place of habit in

conduct, (2) the place of impulse in conduct, and (3) the place of
intelligence in conduct.

Habits are compared to physiological functions

and

like

breathing

though the latter are involuntary while habits are
acquired. Habits are social, for if an individual were alone in the
world he would not be able to form habits. Psychologists agree with
this a child allowed to grow up separated from all human contact
digesting,

;

would not and could not develop a personality.
Dewey asserts that there is no such thing as "neutrality in conduct." "Conduct." he says, "is always shared," and so it is meaningless to say that conduct ougJit to be social, for

necessarily

it

is

whether good or bad.
Individuals come and go, but their habits endure therefore the
kind of world that our descendants will enjoy depends upon the
Simply wishing for the abolition of war,
habits that we practice.
social,

;

industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for

all,

will not

"There must be change in the objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment, not
merely on the hearts of men."

bring them about.

may

Desire, while a feeble thing,
ideal

is

preceded by an actuality

;

set the ball rolling.

but the ideal

is

more than

"Every
a repe-

image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider
and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced
in a precarious, accidental, fleeting wav."
Thus, by occasionally
tition in inner

seeing wild flowers,

man came

to desire the

beauty the flowers, and
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them making better flowers and

this led to cultivation of

in greater

abundance.

The

essence of habit he believes, "is an acquired predisposition

ways or modes of response."

to

It

means

"special sensitiveness or

and
means

accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilection

aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts.

It

will."

Although he rejects individualistic free will, he does hold that
environment binds the will.
Taking up "Character and Conduct," he discusses free will and
ideas of morality which have been widely accepted heretofore. Here
are two characteristic sentences

"A

holiness of character

which

is

celebrated only on holy-days

is

unreal."

"A
upon
in

virtue of honesty, or chastity, or benevolence,

itself

apart from definite results, consumes

itself

which lives
and goes up

smoke."

We

must recognize that

be modified, no matter

observed form or object
ideals of justice, peace,

new psychology

in a

changing world old habits have to

how good
is

human

will assist

they have seemed to us.

but a challenge," and so

it

is

"Any

with our

brotherhood, equality, or order.

"in breaking

down

The

of old rigidities of

and preparing the way for acts that recreate an environment.
that customs are not formed by a consolidation of
individual habits but chiefly because individuals face the same situAn individual usually acquires
ations and react in the same way.
This
the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group.
seems verv evident. Certainly a man born in Turkey will acquire
different ideals of morality from one born in Presbyterian Scotland.
Dewey believes that we have been unfair to the helpless child in
forcing our beliefs upon it.
"Education," he says, "becomes the
art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of
habit

He shows

custom."

Customs, savs Dewey, have supplied the
activities

the

:

they "constitute moral standards."

word moral

itself is

criticises

indnrds o personal

from the Latin "mores," which means

toms, as in the famous exclamation of Cicero

He

st

This seems to be true

Westermarck for

"O

cus-

tempora, o mores."

treating sympathetic resentment

and approbation as pure emotions giving
that "feelings as well as reason

:

rise to acts.

He

declares

spring up within action."

It

is
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breach of or

custom that excites

fidelity to

in

us sympathetic resent-

ment or approbation.

The

chfiferent classes in society

own

develop their

are their working morals, and each class believes

merce, travel, communication, war, inventions
constantly breaking up the old customs

and

all

;

it is

customs, which
right

;

but com-

in industry, etc., are

"frozen habits thaw out

are mixed again."

and races. Today nations and races with
moral standards are facing each other. "The demand of
each side," he says, "treats its opponent as a wilful violator of moral
principles, an expression of self-interest or superior might."
(This
so with nations

It is

diflferent

was written

in the

year 1918.)

The discussion from there on is chiefly of psychological interest,
until we come to the chapter on "The uniqueness of Good."
By
means of the true psychology, he believes, we have revealed to us
the nature of good or satisfaction.
"Good consists in the meaning
that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict a»id entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate
unified orderly release in action."

In other words, good

tion of conflicting elements, resulting in

Many

faction.

compromises.

in a

a resolu-

an action that gives us

satis-

of our unifications, however, are merely temporary

The good

the contrary, "the good
It is

is

new every

is
is

not a stereotyped, monotonous thing.

never twice

alike.

It

inorning. fresh every evening.

On

never copies

itself.

unique

in its

It

is

every presentation."
In the chapter on

"The Nature of Aims," he shows the pernicious
"fixed ends," which was the cornerstone of

effect of the idea of

We do not shoot arrows because targets
up targets simply to make our shooting more sigand effective, and we keep changing the targets. Making

orthodox moral theory.
exist,

but

nificant

we

set

motive or intention the touchstone of morals

equally futile.

is

It

makes them an end. Dewev would do away with such "ends" comEnds are in fact endless, "forever coming into existence
pletelv.
as

new

activities occasion

new consennences."

equivalent to saying that "there are no ends

This he believes

— that

is,

no

is

fixed, self-

enclosed finalities."
In

"The Nature

of Principles." he crit'C'ses Kant's philosonhy in

certain particulars, but p'^vs tribute to the moral value of Kant's

famous rule of action, that the test of an act is whether an individual
would want to make it a tmiversal l^w. "Looked at in the light of
reason, everv mean, insincere, inconsiderate motive of action shrivels
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which a person wants to take advantage of
and which he would be horrified to have others
Kindly, decent acts, on the contrary, extend and mulact upon.
tiply themselves in a continuing harmony."
In Desire and Intelligence he maintains that "impulse is primary'
and intelligence secondary and in some sense derivative." Recoginto a private exception
in his

own
.

nition

It

.

.

of this

thought
not

favor,

however, he thinks exalts intelligence, "for

fact,

not the slave of impulse to do

is

knows what

it is

after;

it

rushes blindly into any opening

expends

it

satisfies

it.

.

.

.

its

bidding.

cannot give orders even
it

chances to

find.

Impulse does

wants to.
Anything that
if it

Intelligence converts desire into plans,

systematic plans based on assembling facts, reporting events as they

happen, keeping tab on them and analyzing them."

On

the other

and no one is deceived
Impulse burns
so readily as a person under strong emotion.
itself up; emotion cannot be kept at its full tide."
In Part IV he states that conduct, when discussed under heads
like habit, impulse, and intelligence, gets "artificially shredded."
He
now sums up the ethical problem. Very briefly, we see that morality
is not something static
His leading conclusion is
it is a process.
that "morals has to do with all activity into which alternative posFor wherever they enter, a difference between better
sibilities enter.
and worse arises."
He would apply the trial and error method to ethics. "All moral
judgment is experimental and subject to revision by its issue." Here
hand, "nothing

is

so easy to follow as impulse,

.

again

we

He

see the ethical pragmatist.

.

.

scorns the old traditional

school of morals which, while displaying anxious solicitude for a few

most others "baths of exemption," so that "a moral moratorium prevails for everyday affairs."
Morals, he declares, "means growth of conduct in meaning.
acts, gives

.

In the largest sense of the word, morals

is

education.

It is

.

;

.

learning

we are about and employing the meaning in
Again he hammers away at the idea of "fixed ideals." "If

the meaning of what
action."
it

is

better to travel than to arrive,

stant arriving, while that arrival

it

is

because traveling

is

a con-

which precludes further traveling

most easilv attained by going to sleep or dying."
His empirical position is expressed again and again with the
greatest force. Progress means "extension of the significance found
within experience." We must not. however, expect such progress
to bring us immunity from perplexity and tro'ible.
If lie were going
to make a categorical imperative like Kant, he would sav
"So act
is

:
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meaning of present experience." Experience, then,
But there can be no absolute imperative. Each
case must be acted upon on its own merits.
The business man compares today's liabilities and assets with yesterday's, and it should be so morally with the business of living.
as to increase the
is

our moral guide.

He

discusses the relation of evolution to ethics, and believes that

"the ethical import of the doctrine of evolution

enormous." Evolu-

is

means "continuity of change." The old fixed goal idea leads
pessimism and the war showed the bankruptcy of our old ethical

tion
to

After

standards.

all,

man

because he has the urge of living

lives

and not because of philosophical reasons for living. Even the experience of trouble and failure is valuable in furnishing us instruction.
Humility is an aid to endeavor and we should prize every opportunity

of present growth.

What
ment,

is

perfection?

Plato. Aristotle,

much

believes

it

means "perfecting,

now or never."
and Spinoza, made good and

intellectual abstractions.

put too

He

and the good

fulfilling,

fulfil-

is

too

evil

much

of

was on a better scent but
Good must be made a matter

I'tilitarianism

value into the future.

of social experience here and now.

Dewey's doctrine is not mere Epicureanism, which failed to congood with the full reach of activities. That is true, he main-

nect

tains, of all theories

based on the individual

self.

It is

not the resi-

dence of experience that counts, but the contents of the house.

must

visualize a larger self

and the way

to help others

is

We

them
He would

to give

opportunity to enlarge and strengthen their personalities.
have us delivered from professional reformers and busybodies.
Since morals

is

concerned with everyday conduct, and "grows

out of specific empirical facts," he has no good

commands, rewards, and

ural
'"it is

that

which

is

closest to

penalties."

human

nature

word

Morals
;

it

is

a

for "supernat-

human

not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical."

cal,

ence

is

ethics

related to other sciences.

He

thing;

ineradicably empiri-

is

Moral

sci-

believes that even Spencer's

was too Utopian.

However, he points out
of fact, but in the use
things as they are
ferent."

And

is

that morality "resides not in perception

made

of

its

perception.

.

.

.

Perception of

but a stage in the process of making them dif-

so morality begins with the use of our

knowledge of

natural law. and "use varying with the active system of disposition

and

desires.''
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Conflict

is

the goad which stirs ns to observation and

instigates us to invention, but social hostility

harmony.
sanction

is

memory and

not the road to social

Darwinism has been perverted in making it appear to
war and brutality of competition. On the other hand, we

should not profess

do so

537

smug

We

hypocrisy.

is

them "as a challenge

satisfaction with things as they are, for to

should recognize existing facts and use

to intelligence to

modify the environment and

change habits."

He believes that the road to freedom "may be found in that
knowledge of facts which enables us to employ them in connection
wth desires and aims." Freedom contains three chief elements: (1)
capacity to vary
change the course of action, and (3) the power of desire
and choice to be factors in events.
We do not use the present to control the future, he says, but "we
use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activefficiency in action, ability to carry out plans, (2)

plans, to

It is in this

ities."

Dewey, freedom

is

use of desire, deliberation, and choice, that, for
actualized.

Finally, in the last chapter, he emphasizes the fact once

Our

more

by factors outside our conscious mind.
Our conscience is based on our
Moral judgment and moral
feeling for the opinion of our follows.
responsibility are the work of the social environment and show conclusively that our morality is social.
The actions of an individual
bear the stamp of his community just as does the language he speaks.
that morality

This

is

is

social.

simply a statement of

thinking

fact,

is

largely determined

without saying that

it

is

right, as

when a man is socially admired just because he has made money.
Mere blame or approbation does not determine underlying ethical
values.

"If the standard of morals

tion given

ment

is

The

is low, it is because the educaby the interaction of the individual with hs social environ-

defective."
scientific

study of

human

materials for true judgments on
of the science of hiunan nature

nature will give us the method and

human
is,

conduct.

The development

therefore, a matter of prime im-

portance for a right understanding of ethics.

Religion, he thinks,

dogma, and myth, instead of being a sense of
the whole and a spontaneous thing. It has produced "an intolerable
superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the
part of the many."
Every act of ours must carry with it a sense of the whole to
which it belongs and wh.ich in a sense belongs to it yet we are rehas

lost itself in cults,

:
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own personal acts and are freed from the burden of responsibility for the whole. His last sentences are suggestive of Royce's idea in the "Great Community":
sponsible only for our

"Within the flickering inconsequential

acts

of separate selves

dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them.

In

its

The

life

of

presence

we

put off mortality and live in the universal.

which we

and have our being is the fit symbol
of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of
the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies."
the

community

in

live

